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DISENGAGE AND OBSTRUCT:
The UN-of-Values and the
Human Rights Council

Presidential administrations are always tugged by idealism
and interest in foreign affairs because, well, that’s America.
Sometimes the idealism is more globalist and sometimes it is
more sovereigntist, and likewise the varieties of interests—
there are liberal and conservative varieties of each. The Obama
administration, at least to outsiders, has seemed more polarized than most, between a particularly florid liberal internationalism, on the one hand, and a New Liberal Realism, on
the other, that is particularly fervid because, in part, it sees
itself as reacting to that other idealism in American foreign
policy, the neoconservativism that predominated in the first
Bush administration.
On the one hand, therefore, there is a profound idealist
belief that the United Nations has ways to sift out cooperation from competition among states, through the universal
solvent of international law and institutions and that the
collective-action problems inherent in multilateralism can be
solved. Idealism can overcome interest, or even idealism is
interest—and it can overcome in a very particular fashion,
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by getting people to sign documents and assent to words
on paper. On the other hand, there is realism pushing in
the opposite direction. It does not really matter what pieces
of multilateral paper are produced, or what documents or
treaties a state signs, or even whether it does or not, because
interests will win the day and a state can, if it wants, almost
always refuse to do something that it committed to do merely
on paper. Save in the very special area of trade—largely outside the United Nations’ remit in any case—there is no
enforcement.
This is a very peculiar realism, however, because it counsels two opposing things. Don’t believe the words on paper,
yours or anyone else’s. But should this make one chary or
sanguine about signing things? The Obama administration
has seemed to be of the view that we should be of good
cheer, downright insouciant about agreeing to things on
paper, because pieces of paper do not really matter, except
as reflecting or as not reflecting one’s current interests. One
might as well sign anything one likes, this realism urges,
because it does not make any difference down the road. So
the idealist and the realist come to share their contentment in
signing multilateral documents—in one case out of hope for
their effectiveness, and in the other case out of indifference
to the same.
This caricature helps show how apparently incompatible extremes can come to the same strategic conclusion.
And both the caricature and the strategic convergence help
convey the role of “values”—words, after all—in shaping
the US relationship to the United Nations. Social relations
at the United Nations—meaning here the general background assumptions of discussion among states, missions,
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bureaucrats, diplomats, and other actors—have a strong if
quiet impact in shaping the terms of argument and negotiation and the composition of political agendas. Words
on paper matter, in part, because of hard calculations of
serial political reputation and trust. They matter as much
or more because they are the currency of diplomacy and
international organizations and law that shape the agendas
for what is to be discussed. Will it be climate change or Iran
or North Korea or African poverty or the UN mission in the
Congo or nonproliferation? Reality does intrude to reshape
the terms of discussion, certainly, but rarely completely—the
beginning point of discussion, which typically begins with
assumptions about certain values and relationships, retain an
influence even as realpolitik conditions the conversation. The
values that establish the terms of thinking around an issue
are often enormously influential and not infrequently decisive in setting boundaries of acceptable thought within the
political society that constitutes the United Nations and its
international community. Framing matters. This occurred in
the run-up to the 2005 UN reform summit, and it occurred
with respect to the Copenhagen climate change conference
as well. It will happen in successive issues down the road as
they are brought to the multilateral hothouse of the United
Nations. Values at the United Nations matter, and they
matter particularly to the United States as a player that acts
explicitly from both interests and ideals.
Unfortunately for the United States, values at the United
Nations all too frequently run contrary to US values, not
to mention US interests. This is so in ways that are frankly
unreformable and likely to grow in frequency over time, particularly if the United States continues its current course of
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decline under cover of multilateralism. Engagement in values exercises at the United Nations is often a profound and
eminently foreseeable mistake for the United States. The best
policy heuristic for the United States in most of the values
debates at the United Nations, therefore, is generally to
abstain from getting involved and quite often to obstruct
the effort. Let’s not bury the lede: many of the things said
in this book with respect to US-UN relations, to this point,
are unlikely to be disputed by the Obama administration—
“We’re doing that, just with slightly less neoconservative language, thanks”—and so trivialized in various ways—“Yawn,
you’re imagining a strawman controversy.”
But where the rubber meets the road for what the Obama
administration has been desperate to do differently from the
preceding administration is found here, in the realm of UN
values—human rights, moral standards and ideals of behavior at the United Nations. It has been eager to engage in all
the venues and conversations that the Bush administration
stepped away from. It has been aggressive about wanting to
show itself and show the face of America in forums of dubious legitimacy, starting with the Human Rights Council and,
until forced out by domestic politics, Durban II. This is leaving aside forums of much harder realism, such as the Security
Council, in which it has also indulged idealistic symbolism—
a nuclear-free world—while offering the United States, its
friends and allies and even merely enemies-of-my-enemy, no
answer to an Iranian nuke. Whereas values statements and
symbols are seen as down payments on future exercises of
political will, the consequences of these signals emerge in
many unanticipated ways.
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There are two profound relationships that arise from
the treatment of values in multilateral forums. The first is
that the rest of the multilateral world—lacking good proxies of long-term political willpower—will anticipate at least
some significant future behaviors on the basis of today’s values assertions, and, if they are weak multilateral bromides
that signal an inward focus and indifference to hegemonic
leadership, that will be noted. Values matter to that signal. The second is that the values that matter not only to
the United States, but also to other democratic sovereigns
committed to human rights (in some broad-church sense,
regardless of disputes among themselves and with the United
States over the values’ meaning and definition) shelter under
the umbrella of US hegemony. This offends the pride of
universalism—but, paradoxically, “universal” values, at least
of the kind that the United States and its kindred idealists
treasure, are possible only because of a rough-and-ready shell
of American hegemony, not power alone, precisely, but hegemony of a kind that mingles power with a roughly shared set
of ideals.
If, by contrast, one yearns for American decline and the
rise of a new, post-American-hegemony world of cooperative great powers in peace and harmony, think again—the
human rights universalism of the last twenty years has been
an epiphenomenon of American hegemony. If this fades, the
human rights universalists fade with it. A multipolar world
is competitive and more aggressively Westphalian, not less.
Countries whose general engagement with both the universalist project and American hegemony was not before in
question are already making other plans. That Brazil would
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be in commercial discussions with Iran is not surprising; the
overtly political tone of its current discussions is.
But the Obama administration thinks it manages to avoid
the horns of these apparent dilemmas by adopting the doubletake sketched above. Its liberal internationalists believe that the
United States, and the world, can have the multilateralism—
not only without these consequences but with many, many
positive returns. Its New Liberal Realists presumably do not
believe that for a moment—they believe the far more realistic proposition that multilateralism is strategic withdrawal by
another name and that this is the Kissingerian good. The New
Liberal Realists instead believe in insouciance, that it does
not finally matter what one sets one’s name to in the process
because one can always walk away.
They cannot both be right; the reasoning is mutually exclusive. Yet they have reached the same strategic conclusion—
entering forums and conversations about fundamental values
is gain, not loss. Which will it be? The answer matters if the
piece of paper under discussion concerns, for example, fundamental rights of free speech and expression or other matters of domestic constitutional importance. As Eric Posner
has noted, one reason why the “transnationalist” legal position is able to maintain such a prominent place as against
resurgent liberal realism is that it is not fundamentally about
relations in and with the world—it is primarily a legal tool
for seeking to alter legal debates within the United States,
to bring supposed international law and obligations to bear
on domestic legal issues and upon domestic democratic processes. In that case, perhaps the contradiction between the
liberal internationalists and the New Liberal Realists is not
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so pronounced—they seek to affect different spheres, divided
between domestic and foreign policy.
In any case, the Obama administration seems to believe its
single strategic answer on largely inconsistent grounds clever.
But it is too clever by half. The reason why the United States
should not engage with forums that, on their own terms,
propose to negotiate fundamental values in the name of universal human rights is simple: many of the values that the
United Nations and its forums might propose to negotiate
are not negotiable for the United States. Much of the argument over such venues as the Human Rights Council are that
simple. It matters that the Human Rights Council is a corrupt forum, populated by many of the worst abusers, dominated by them and their agendas, and that the United States
should not grant it legitimacy. But even if the HRC consisted
of the purest of states, many of the matters that might be
taken up there are not actually in the power of the United
States government to negotiate because they belong to the
people of the United States through their Constitution—to
them and them alone.
Granted, it is not always true that international negotiations involve deep human-values issues and therefore are
beyond negotiation by the United States because of its own
constitutional processes. Sometimes these are very important
matters. For example, the United States should get involved
directly in negotiations over human trafficking, which,
after all, does implicate deep values. But such cases are the
exceptions. The United States should be deeply wary of any
presumption of engagement that would have it involved in
negotiating, for example, over free expression—a very live

214

HEURISTICS

subject in UN forums these days. No simple rule can distinguish the negotiable from the nonnegotiable in every circumstance in advance. But if an issue goes to a core value of
the United States in ways that run to its internal democratic
behaviors so as to propose that its internal processes might be
overturned by outsiders—including but certainly not limited
to its constitutional matters—then it is a clear mistake even
to join discussions, even less so, obviously, when discussions
are with those that dominate the Human Rights Council.
This does not mean keeping silent. To the contrary, the
United States should articulate and seek to press, as policy
and action, its values in many different venues, outside of
the institutional United Nations or in those forums of the
United Nations in which negotiation of those values is not
the game. But it should take care about joining values processes that are about negotiation—and virtually never those
that effectively propose to negotiate core “American” values
by recasting them as “global” values. By recasting them as
“universal” and “global,” the ironic effect is to put things
that Americans thought beyond negotiation up for negotiation with the rest of the world, worse still in a rolling-text,
consensus-based negotiation. As a general rule of thumb, the
United States should never engage with any of these things.
Unfortunately, the UN processes frame values debates
in a manner that tempts the United States to be a player in
consensus processes. It also makes the debates at once
seem innocuous (because who is not in favor of baby seals
or promoting global religious toleration?) and unthreatening (because none of this is truly binding) and appealing to
in-built US moralism (because, of course, the United States
of America has something important to say about human
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rights and democracy). It is hard to say no at the front end.
This is so if one has committed oneself to a view, as the
Obama administration has done, that engagement is a good
thing for its own sake.
This is also particularly so for those who believe instinctively that US and UN values significantly or even mostly
overlap and can come together in negotiations reflecting
good will. They are, alas, quite wrong about this much of
the time. The Bush administration had few such idealists; the
Obama administration has many, though, under Secretary
Clinton, fewer than at the beginning. But engagement here
also tempts the realists, who see in values negotiations at the
United Nations a cheap way of buying off various constituencies, both domestic and international, with little more than
talk. None of it is binding, and, compared with the verities
of interests, who cares? Curiously, the Bush administration
had fewer of these realists than one might have thought.
To the contrary, a large part of the Bush administration’s
refusal to engage and its reputation for obstruction derived
from its belief that words actually mattered a lot, and therefore it would hoard them and offer them up accordingly.
The Obama administration’s promiscuity with words is well
known; at some point it will have said everything that anyone
would like to hear to everyone, and then what? Irrespective
of which administration indulges in this sort of thinking,
however, it is dangerous and hubristic.
The United Nations does not lack for values. On the contrary, the United Nations has a long list of values, things
that it says are politically, morally, and legally good, or matters of human rights. They are not all obviously or necessarily consistent with one another, and disagreements crop
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up frequently. Intervention to prevent mass slaughter by a
regime is good, but so is the territorial integrity of member
states. Children’s rights are important, and there is a treaty
to prove it, but so are the family laws of shari’a, providing many Muslim states a basis for a treaty reservation to
bypass much of the children’s rights convention. Over the
six decades since promulgation of the Charter in 1945, categories of values have multiplied and reproduced, evolved
and mutated, until the UN system positively teems with
values and assertions of the many things and propositions
for which the United Nations supposedly stands. Many of
these values the United States shares—which, the United
States should also be clear, does not mean they are matters
of “rights.” But not a small number the United States does
not share and should not endorse. Some the United States
should affirmatively oppose. And their number is growing,
not shrinking, over time.
Although the universal human rights of individuals as
a concept was present at the United Nations’ founding, for
much of its existence, the real driver of institutional values
has been not human rights but international peace. Human
rights was present at the birth of the United Nations, not
just in the Charter, but also in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, later, in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which, taken
altogether, are often described as the “international bill of
rights.” Once the Cold War was underway in earnest by the
late 1940s and early ’50s, however, world peace was the fundamental ideal for which public opinion in the United States
and Western Europe looked to the United Nations. Dreams
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of a world government and the other apparatus of popular
idealism about the United Nations in that period were largely
about a peaceful world, one free of nuclear weapons and the
threat of nuclear Armageddon. To the extent that human
rights was a subject, it was typically a kind of adjunct to the
main project of international peace, the rule of law by-product
of a peaceful world under a world government.
The other main driver of values at the United Nations,
which began bubbling up in the 1950s and then exploded
with the wars of national liberation and decolonialization of
the 1960s and ’70s, was the self-determination of peoples.
Although this could be understood as a matter of human
rights, it was independently declared as a value in the Charter,
a matter of the rights of a group, and it harkened back to a
conceptually distinct category of thought that dated back at
least to Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points. With the
United Nations frozen through the Cold War with respect
not only to material interests of the East-West superpowers
but with respect to values as well, the Third World groupings
at the United Nations—the Nonaligned Movement and subsequently the Group of 77—came to dominate values discussions at the General Assembly and its appendages.
For the new states, the United Nations was a natural place
to make their claims, a place to gain legitimacy and recognition, and a forum for making their voices heard as the emergent majority of states. And the United States did not start
out as a necessary, natural target for these new movements.
Unlike Britain or France, it did not have a long history of
overseas imperialism or extensive imperial claims of territory. Indeed, successive US governments generally had been
unsympathetic to European imperialism. Yet over time, the
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United States, along with Israel, became the target of antiimperialist and anticolonialist ideology. This continues to the
present day.
Human rights as a specific expression of the paramount
values of the United Nations goes back to the latter years of
the Cold War. Human rights gradually achieved “apex” status
over the older universal ideals such as world peace—but only
with a certain degree of difficulty. Human rights as a value,
in contrast to international peace and security, challenges territorial sovereignty and the assumption that states could not
be called to account for conduct within their borders. While
human rights values had been immensely useful to the anticolonial cause, once national liberation had been achieved,
the interests and perceptions of the new states and their rulers, often despotic and sometimes genocidal, shifted to favor
the perquisites of sovereignty. What is more, it was far from
clear that the claims of human rights always assisted the messy
compromises of achieving peace. The slogan of the human
rights movement, “No Justice, No Peace,” represented a
quasi-religious, determinedly Kantian absolutism asserted as
an empirical thesis for which there was, and is, little evidence.
Nevertheless, over time, human rights gradually took hold
not just as a value but as the primary, apex language of values
at the United Nations. The triumph of human rights as values
at the institution was largely completed after 1990, in what
appeared to many at the time as the permanent victory of liberal democracy in the struggle of political ideals. Many leading democracies incorporated human rights as part of their
formal foreign policy apparatus, the United States included.
This was the time of dreaming of a New World Order, a
time of optimism for the view of history that animated many
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liberal internationalists: history as the forward movement
toward more enlightened forms of governance and eventually establishing governance over the anarchy of sovereign
nation-states. An idealized United Nations was understood
as the vehicle for these hopes; the contradictions of these
visions only gradually emerged.
Human rights discourse allows those who wield it to
speak categorically. It offers a language of political mobilization that, in principle, brooks no opposition. After all, in traditional liberal political terms, a right in its purest expression
is both a trump and a shield. Considerations of consequences,
utility, and power cannot overcome a successful invocation of
rights; that is why rights are important in liberalism.
The problem with a successful language of political mobilization, however, is that everyone wants to use it, particularly if, in principle, it admits of no opposition. In addition
to embracing the traditional liberal-bourgeois political rights
of individuals, however, the core underlying UN documents
also embrace cultural, social, and economic rights. Cultural
and social rights are group rights that can easily be in profound opposition to an individual’s rights—when, say, taking a child away from a parent, for example, to ensure that it
is raised in the group culture or religion. Economic rights,
for their part, involve aspirations and decisions of economic
policy that are not amenable to categorical provision. A state
can decide as of today that it will not torture people, and it
can, if it wills, be 100 percent effective in its decision. It will
have a more difficult time deciding categorically that it will
double salaries across the board and end poverty today and
give everyone a five-week paid summer vacation and retirement at full pay at age 52.
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Nevertheless, the United Nations has seen the growth of
rights as a language for everything anyone might think important or want. The United Nations and its organs, its member
states and the world of NGOs, speak and write and demand
a promiscuous list of categoricals—bewildering in their complexity, unclear in their derivation, and unshakeable in their
self-confidence. There are civil and political rights, rights to
the self-determination of peoples, economic rights and social
rights and community rights, rights against slavery and the
trafficking in persons, rights of individuals, rights of groups,
women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, rights of the disabled, the indigenous, the immigrants, the refugees, and the
migrants; there are rights of combatants and noncombatants
in armed conflict, of prisoners and detained persons, rights
against torture and inhumane treatment and police brutality and extrajudicial execution and disappearance, rights to
food, health, medicine, and education, rights to land, rights
to gender, racial, ethnic, and religious equality, rights of civil
society to freely organize, rights to peace and international
security, rights against genocide and crimes against humanity, rights against international aggression, rights to territorial
integrity of states, rights of democracy and exercising the consent of the governed, the rights of traditional societies to their
customs even if not so democratic, the right of respect for
religion, the right of free expression—and oh so many more.
If everything is a right, then nothing is a right—not really.
The rhetoric of rights has become so flexible that it can cover
any claimed social good. When you call some good a right,
however, what you are really saying is that this thing should
jump the queue over other claimed social goods and take priority. That is, after all, the point—to say that these special
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things cannot, or should not, be denied, relative to other
social claims. But as political philosopher Michael Walzer presciently remarked in the early 1980s, at the beginning of this
process, “The effort to produce a complete account of justice
or a defense of equality by multiplying rights soon makes a
farce of what it multiplies. To say of whatever we think people
ought to have they have a right to have it is not to say very
much. Men and women do indeed have rights beyond life and
liberty, but these do not follow from our common humanity;
they follow from shared conceptions of social goods; they are
local and particular in character.”1
Over the long term, everyone has learned the rhetorical
“rights” move, even those representing theocratic despotisms
such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. And as the scope of topics has
inexorably widened, this language of political motivation
has simultaneously weakened. Not every rights claim can be
treated as inviolable trump, after all. And in political processes at the United Nations, clashes that might once have
been presented as debates over interests suitable for compromise have become matters of rights that cannot be altered.
The language of rights, from the vantage point of the United
Nations and its member states, is at once mobilizing and
immobilizing. It is another feature of the UN-in-stasis.
One way of dealing with the intellectual, and inevitably
political, contradictions is simply to decide not to deal with
them. One senior human rights NGO leader on whom I
pressed this issue some years ago finally responded with some
exasperation that it was a merely political venture, so I should
1. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
(New York: Basic Books, 1983), xv.
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just get used to it. A human right, he said, is not a component
of some preexisting list. Rather, it is simply whatever in retrospect the human rights community has succeeded in making
a right, using the mechanisms of international forums and
the language of political mobilization.
The polite way to describe this is as an evolutionary conception of rights. But “serial absolutism” might be a better
name. Categorical, absolute, nonnegotiable political positions today—but quite possibly replaced with new, equally
categorical, nonnegotiable positions tomorrow. It is far from
a complete free-for-all, however, because, as with all political
processes, it is skewed to favor some over others. The NR A
fares less well among the global bourgeoisie of the United
Nations than does Amnesty International.
The United States has a serious interest in preserving
the objective, universal, deep but therefore—of necessity—
limited character of rights. Progress does not consist of
multiplying rights. One reason for the American interest is
that its own internal political community is founded upon
rights, rights in the limited but profound sense, not merely
as a strategic and expedient political language. Both for its
own place in the world, as well as for the integrity of its own
political language, the United States needs to be clear with
the world about its own language and conception of rights.
And that conception is bourgeois, liberal, and rooted in the
pursuit of happiness, yes (and also in Lockean concepts of
liberty of property and the ability to alienate it, which is to
say, the rights attaching to market relationships among freely
consenting individuals). The American conception of rights
remains meaningful—because it generates some outcomes
but not others and because it is not infinitely flexible and
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indeterminate. But it will not long remain so, even for the
Americans, if successive governments of the United States
treat the language of human rights, in its dealings with others, as a merely strategic language.
Moreover, the United States really does believe in the concept of universal rights for the world. That does not necessarily mean sending in the Marines or undertaking to liberate
Iraq from Saddam. The United States is in the process of
learning that culture matters rather more than American
foreign policy neoconservatives in the Bush administration
thought. In that regard, at this writing, it would not be
responsible to try and predict where the Arab Spring revolutions will finally come out—whether liberal or illiberal, it is
impossible today to say. But if it is a mistake today to deploy
them to support the arguments of this book, similarly, it is
too early to deploy them to refute its arguments, too. But
in any case, the United States has a moral duty to itself and
others to ensure at a bare minimum that the language of
Enlightenment human rights at least be preserved for others
in the world, as a category of meaning, to use on their own
behalf. The United States cannot do this by adopting a getalong-go-along attitude toward the proliferating assertions
of rights made in world bodies.
This is an exceedingly unfashionable view of both rights
and the role of the United States, not just outside the United
States but, let us acknowledge, inside the Obama administration, too—whether among its liberal internationalists
or its New Liberal Realists. It conjures up an intellectual
world long past and understandings of rights that were
arguably out of date even at the time of Eleanor Roosevelt.
But the content of rights at the United Nations is changing
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again—changing from the strategic language of liberalism
into a strategic language profoundly and dismayingly different, an illiberal language of, among other things, global
religious communalism. Strategically inclined, postmodern
progressives, for whom the language of human rights was
long currency for them alone to spend, inflate, and deflate,
are likely to find that the language of rights has somehow
transformed itself into an illiberal language, one whose ends
they do not finally share. Why? Because they wasted and
despoiled it when it was theirs. Rights only mean anything
when they are deep and narrow.
These understandings condition what the United States
should aim to achieve in choosing to participate or not in
symbolic forums of world political institutions in which the
core issues are values and rights. Precisely because these are
issues of symbolism, they are the issues on which the pure
decision to engage or not to engage matters the most. If the
United States merely goes along—whether for cynically realist reasons or for improvidently idealistic ones—it corrupts
its own use of the language of liberal rights, and it contributes to depriving others of that language.
Because the United States regards rights—conceived in a
deep and, therefore, limited fashion—as universal, it is quite
willing to use them as a mechanism for criticizing other
countries. This willingness is always qualified by realpolitik
and will sometimes exempt friends and allies and sometimes
even exempt enemies. There is no question that the United
States’ use of the language of rights has been conditioned by
its calculations of interest. During the late Cold War, Ronald
Reagan’s UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, tried to resolve
the discrepancy by arguing that a purely evenhanded human
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rights standard was highly unlikely to move totalitarian US
enemies; it might, however, undermine less-than-totalitarian
but still brutal and unattractive US friends. It might even
move them into even worse human rights conditions of
Soviet-style communism.
Kirkpatrick’s argument was not really one from realism, as
it was often portrayed, but instead an argument from idealism, premised on the virtue of the attainable second best ideal
over the unattainable, and finally more damaging because
unattained, ideal. Mixed arguments from both idealism and
realism also sometimes crop up. They include the claim that
the maintenance of a general level of global security, including through unattractive but necessary friends, is better than
disorder—and quite possibly a necessary condition for achieving human rights gains. Regardless of the form of argument,
realpolitik remains unapologetically on the table, and no less
so in the Obama administration than in any other. Consider
only the current State Department’s general unwillingness,
for example, directly to criticize China’s human rights record.
Yet despite its inconsistency in the willingness to criticize
human rights, and with respect to whom, the United States
has as its basic attitude that human rights are universal and
that they should be pressed, where politically prudent, upon
other countries. Moreover, the US government has long
made a sizable commitment to monitoring and producing
an account of human rights, country by country, around the
world. The State Department’s annual human rights reports
have had occasional distortions throughout the years, but
overall they are understood by the human rights community
to be a useful, and reasonably fair, annual account of human
rights worldwide.
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The United States also accepts that under some circumstances there can even be a right—and perhaps even a narrow
obligation—to intervene by force to stop or prevent massive
human rights abuses. That was its view in Bosnia and later
in Kosovo, and as this is being written, in Libya, too. This is
subject to many realist constraints, but the principle has been
accepted that there exists some right and responsibility to protect populations even from their own governments. Overall,
the view of the United States at least since the 1970s has been
that human rights are an expression of American values—
something the United States ideally, if not always in practice,
ought to carry outward in its dealings with the world.
But “outward to the world” does not necessarily mean “to
international institutions such as the UN” and still less “in
thrall to them.” The world is not federal and US sovereignty is justified by its popular liberal democracy, accountable inwardly to its people. To the contrary, one of the core
features of the US view of human rights is that it ideally—
with whatever realist caveats—ought primarily to condition
bilateral state-to-state relations. Human rights as a practical
policy, the US view contends, has greatest effect not through
grand multilateral institutions but instead in the weight that
the United States can bring to bear in its total relationship
with a given state. As policy, human rights does best when it
consists of geopolitical realism in the form of political pressure brought to bear in the name of universal human rights
idealism—multilateralism through institutions at most provides weakly shared universal values and commitments as a
backdrop for that political pressure.
What is more, the human rights vision the United States
carries outward to the world is bifurcated; it reserves for itself
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policymaking latitude, as for other self-governing democratic
sovereignties. It takes its own democratic processes seriously
even when it shows little patience when “internal” sovereign
standards are invoked by human rights abusing nations. This
is seen around the world as the United States invoking a double standard—and that perception is not entirely unfair. It
is, however, right. The fundamental notion of international
law—the sovereign equality of states—is a useful rule in some
circumstances but not when it requires lumping together for
purposes of “values” the states that have the liberal, democratic rule of law and the ones that do not. In referring to a
double standard, I am not talking here just about all the issues
of counterterrorism—detention, interrogation, torture and
abuse, and rendition—on which the United States is quite
willing to invoke its own internal standards and ignore other
internationally accepted ones. The issue is not even limited
to nonterrorism concerns that important parts of the world
see as US human rights abuses—most notably its continued
embrace of the death penalty. Potent though those sources
of controversy over the US stance may be, alone they would
not produce the deep unhappiness that substantial numbers
at the United Nations, in Europe, and in the international
human rights community have long felt toward the United
States on human rights, long predating the war on terror.
The broad issue is that even as the United States presses
other countries to abide by many external, international standards of human rights, it also insists on abiding by its own
internal standards as generated by its own internal democratic processes. This is not just true of the death penalty and
counterterrorism but of many issues—international children’s
rights, for example, immigration and asylum law, and a great
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deal else besides. But the United States operates on a double
standard only if one believes that international human rights
is purely a matter of international law—meaning that the view
of what human rights are, how they shall be understood, and
how they shall be applied belongs, in the final analysis, to
international bodies, institutions, organizations, belongs, in
other words, to the United Nations.2
The United States has never—including today under
the Obama administration—accepted this view of human
rights and internal US standards. The US view of itself as
a political community, expressed in its constitutional order,
says plainly that, so far as rights internal to the United States
are concerned, the US Constitution is supreme—and the
US willingness to put its standards first is not limited to
constitutional matters either. So, yes, insofar as one’s legal
conception of human rights is that they are binding as interpreted by bodies outside the United States, the United States
does indeed adopt a double standard. It holds its constitution supreme with respect to its territory and political order,
2. The argument made on behalf of the “universal” authority of the UN
wrongly conflates “universal” with “international.” It assumes that international
bodies are impartial and disinterested, because they are not territorially based
but does not consider the only too likely possibility that international bodies
have interests and partialities of their own—precisely the list of partialities and
interests that one would attribute to institutions and people who are not tied to
a particular territory. Upon making this observation at a human rights conference some years ago, I was told in somewhat shocked tones that this kind of
skepticism would make me a “moral relativist.” But in fact it is not an argument
from moral relativism. Not all skepticism about rights arises from relativism.
One can, for example, be skeptical not about rights as such but about this particular claim of right. Or, as I suggest here, one can accept the notion of objective
human rights while being skeptical as to who should be able to definitively and
finally interpret and pronounce the content of those rights. It is skepticism not as
to the existence of rights but as to who shall pronounce them.
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and that fact does not stop it from using human rights as a
language, strategy, and device for the promotion of what it
regards as universal values elsewhere in the world. One can,
therefore, understand the anger. The US position sounds like
not merely a double standard but a naked assertion of democratic sovereignty over universality to boot.
Yet the criticism is fundamentally mistaken—not the noting of the double standard, which is in some sense real, but in
the belief that the double standard arises out of an assertion
of sovereignty as such. The real justification of the US position is that when it comes to human rights, the United States,
to reiterate, does not hold to the formal equality of states. The
United Nations does so, and no doubt it must. But the United
States, for purposes of the universal content of human rights,
does not consider all states as its moral equals. It divides the
world into the liberal democracies that have substantive possession of the rule of law and everyone else.
The United States is happy to accord members of the former group the same status of self-rule as it claims for itself.
To be sure, not all countries in that position want to exercise
that function, because they envision the role of international
institutions differently from the manner in which the United
States conceives it. But the United States affords them that
latitude, whether they then choose to delegate it to the United
Nations or not. And the overall effect is that, with respect to
itself and other functioning liberal democracies, the United
States regards the enforcement of international human rights
not as a direct function of the United Nations or any other
international body—unless such a country chooses to be so
governed. And while some functioning liberal democracies
choose to do so in varying degrees, the United States does not.
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But framing an issue as a matter of rights potentially has
subtle consequences for this dynamic. That is, it tends to shift
the authorized adjudicator and decision maker concerning those
rights. When complex social claims are at issue, the United States
looks principally to its own majoritarian democratic processes
for decisions. Fundamental decisions about the common good
it presumes to be in the remit of the legislature; that presumption can be overcome, but the starting point is popular selfgovernment through legislation. Yet the now-standard move of
human rights advocates, to frame all these contradictory and
inconsistent issues as matters of international human rights, has
implications for who is lawfully authorized to decide the issue.
Human rights, in political terms, is less about what than about
who has authority finally to settle claims.
International human rights thus becomes a mechanism
by which these actors attempt an end run around domestic
legislatures—and the things that the US Congress, as well as
the individual states, have enacted as law. Advocates engage
in an untiring effort to persuade courts inside or outside the
United States to enforce international human rights treaties
and to use treaty language, interpretations, and standards
that come from outside the US domestic system. Very often,
this amounts to NGO advocates’ seeking a second bite at
the apple of controlling political outcomes. They seek to get
from international human rights and its forums results they
could not get from democratic, law-governed domestic processes. The crucial step is not only to shift the substantive
rule from domestic law to international human rights law but
also to shift the decision maker from legislature to courts by
reframing policy questions as matters of international human
rights law.
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The attempt to end-run internal democratic processes has
been discussed at great length by conservative America writers. John Bolton, for example, described this legal-political
move in the late 1990s. Civil society, the glorified term for
NGO advocates, he wrote, “seeks to re-argue its preferred
issues, by trying to leverage political power from outside
of the democratic polities where they have been unsuccessful politically. This ‘outside’ political power may well, over
the long term, leave them in a stronger domestic position
than their opponents, who have neither access to nor allies
beyond their own countries. In effect, therefore, ‘civil society’ attempts to renegotiate the basic constitutional issue of
democracies—who governs?—to its own advantage.”3
He is quite correct. When Bolton wrote, the issues contested in this fashion with respect to the United States
included (among others) the death penalty, the Kyoto
Protocol and climate change, and other environmental issues.
The list has only expanded since then, particularly since 9/11
and the Bush administration’s war-on-terror policies. But the
criticism of the end run does not always come from the right.
Jed Rubenfeld—no one’s idea of a conservative—frames the
issue as a clash of constitutional visions. The European vision
of a constitution, he argues, is an expression of “universal,
liberal, Enlightenment principles, whose authority is superior to that of all national politics, including democratic politics. This universal authority, residing in a normative domain
above politics and nation-states, is what allows constitutional
law, interpreted by unelected judges, to countermand all
3. John R. Bolton, “Is There Really ‘Law’ in International Affairs?,”
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 10, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 31.

232

HEURISTICS

governmental actions, including laws enacted by democratically elected legislators. From this perspective, it’s reasonable
for international organizations and courts to frame constitutions, establish international human rights laws, interpret
these constitutions and laws, and, in general, create a system
of international law to govern nation-states.”4
American constitutionalism is rooted, by utter contrast,
in popular sovereignty. As Rubenfeld notes, in the American
vision, a constitution ought to be made through a national
political community’s “democratic process, because the
business of the constitution is to express the polity’s most
basic legal and political commitments. These commitments
will include fundamental rights that majorities are not free
to violate, but the countermajoritarian rights are not therefore counterdemocratic. Rather, they are democratic because
they represent the nations’s self-given law, enacted through
a democratic constitutional politics.”5 Those with political
agendas unlikely to receive the blessing of democratically
enacted law at the national level have every incentive to seek
the second bite of the apple. But it also bears noting that
they have every incentive as well to confer as much legal
and political legitimacy as possible on the processes and
actors that might vindicate their current claims of human
rights, which is to say, they have great incentive to heap
legitimacy upon the processes and actors of international law
and the institutions of the United Nations. They have great

4. Jed Rubenfeld, “The Two World Orders,” Wilson Quarterly
(Autumn 2003): 26, available at http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article
.cfm?AID=386.
5. Rubenfeld, 27.

Disengage and Obstruct

233

incentives to favor the “international” for its own sake—
even if that might sometimes mean sacrificing the substance
of human rights in favor of “international” processes and
institutions.
In any case, UN institutions assiduously resist doing the
things that ordinarily confer legitimacy within democratic
polities. The General Assembly’s main business oscillates
between waste and wickedness. The Copenhagen conference
was exhibit A in what the General Assembly is all about: rentseeking from the rich world. Not a few academics and intellectuals at Copenhagen found themselves repenting of their
earlier attachment to the legitimacy of the United Nations
as a body of “all the world”—suddenly thinking that an oligarchy of the leading countries needed, instead, to ignore
the sovereign equality of states and just get together and cut
a deal. It likely would have made little difference, for a long
list of reasons related to collective action even among the
oligarchs; and this discussion takes no position on the underlying merits of the scientific case. But the climate change
advocates’ surprise would perhaps have been less had they
paid closer attention, long before Copenhagen, to the functioning of the General Assembly and its organs in matters of
values generally and, particularly, in human rights. For the
prototypical pattern is longer-running and more pronounced
in matters of human rights than in anything else.
Why is it, to start with, that the General Assembly has so
long rested in the hands of its worst members—the illiberal,
authoritarian, totalitarian, corrupt, decrepit states? Why is it
that, in 2009, the General Assembly president was an aged
radical expriest from Nicaragua whose revolution had failed
him but who had risen again on the platform of international
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organizations? And why is it that its next president hailed
from Gaddafi’s Libya? The simple answer is that the worst
actors on the world stage have the most to gain from command of the levers of the United Nations. The worse a
country’s behavior, the greater the return on protective
investment at the General Assembly and its organs. It functions as a rent-extractor, on the one hand, and a protection
racket, on the other. Containment is the watchword for the
General Assembly.
This is not to say that the United States should always
refuse to engage with the General Assembly as such. Its mandate and work, through the various standing committees
and subcommittees, touch nearly everything at the United
Nations and many things of importance to the United States.
There are many particular bodies, committees, and organs
that report to the General Assembly—entities and activities
with which US engagement is prudent and principled. In
some cases, they are functionally independent of the General
Assembly. In other cases—the committee on disarmament,
for example—the United States is able in many cases to have,
if not quite success, certainly an outsize impact on policy. In
such cases, the United States should nearly always engage.
Nonetheless, engagement with a body whose principal currency is symbolism requires careful affirmative justification
and judgment. The core incentive for the United States is to
minimize the role and influence of the General Assembly.
Part of the extended mischief of the General Assembly
takes place through the proliferation of UN conferences.
The function of these extravagant and fantastically expensive events is to create a Potemkin village for the media, the
internet, the world of image that there is a global society
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that comes together around an urgent policy topic: climate
change, racism, or African poverty. It looks a little like a
global constitutional convention around the topic, coming
to understandings and agreements and statements designed
to look very much like law, if not now then down the road.
Why these massive UN road shows? Why not simply undertake these discussions, whatever their value, in the regular
course of business at the United Nations? The answer is the
creation of the illusion for the rest of the world that what is
said is a function not of states and their faceless bureaucrats
but the product of a “society.”
UN conferences deliberately put state parties alongside
NGOs, in concurrent and parallel meetings. They seek to
convey to the global public the picture of politics based both
on states and on a quasi-democratic global populace, represented by the NGOs and all the individual hangers-on. UN
conferences seek to mobilize public pressure in the international community to the ends of political awareness and,
often, the elaboration of “soft law” through pronouncements, final communiqués, declarations, and all manner of
statements that aim to take on the quality of law in some
forum.
The United States’ position regarding UN conferences
and the global circus that accompanies them should be simply to decline to participate—no matter what the issue—and
in the course of many such forums, such as the Durban conferences, active opposition. The United States stands to gain
very little, if anything, from these media extravaganzas under
the best of conditions. And anything that it might gain from
engagement on the issue it can achieve in other forums while
subjecting itself to much less pressure from what landmines
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activist and Nobel prizewinner Jody Williams once described
as the NGOs united together as “a superpower.”6 The entire
hothouse environment of senior government officials, UN
senior leadership, NGOs, advocacy intellectuals and academics, and the traveling street theatre ensures that outcomes
will be less restrained than desirable. Copenhagen must have
convinced at least some global bien-pensant thinkers that
global conferences are not a good way to pursue serious, lasting policy. It is a losing ground for the United States, and the
United States should simply announce that it is not going to
participate in any of them.
The assumption underlying the UN conferences is either
that the planetary elite needs to go on a little retreat, as it
were, to consider some abstraction like racism, in order to
come back with some presumably shared moral resolve, as
though the peoples and nations of the planet were all part
of some shared religious communion or that there is some
extraordinary crisis—climate change being only the most
recent—that requires bypassing the ordinary UN processes
in order to get a deal. Either way, it says a great deal about
the almost entirely imaginary global society that is presumably governed by the United Nations. It also says a great deal
about the utter failure of ordinary processes at the United
Nations to deal with anything. The United States should
simply announce that it will take whatever money it might
have spent on these conferences and spend it instead on
AIDS, malaria, and education in Africa, and challenge other
countries to do the same. A policy of active disengagement,
6. William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2001), p. 27, quoting Jody Williams.
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delegitimization, and obstruction would serve US interests
far better than has the engagement of both the current and
former administrations.
This same policy makes sense as well for that most
prominent—and odious—of the various dependencies of
the General Assembly dealing with UN values and human
rights: the Human Rights Council (HRC).7 Over the course
of several decades, the predecessor to today’s council, the
Human Rights Commission, gradually became a club of the
world’s worst human rights abusers: Libya, Cuba, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia all gravitated toward the then-Human Rights
Commission. It gradually took on two roles—first, exempting its own members from human rights inquiry at the
United Nations and, second, denouncing Israel. The time and
effort invested by human rights abusers in taking control of
the United Nations’ supposedly premier human rights body
rose in tandem with the increased attention to human rights
throughout the 1990s.
By the time of Kofi Annan’s 2005 UN reform initiative,
everyone save the abusers had concluded that the Human
Rights Commission should either be reformed under a new
name or simply abolished. The reformers included Annan
himself, the self-consciously virtuous nations of Europe, the
United States, and the NGOs. This was the considered opinion of the leading editorial pages—the New York Times and
the Economist, for example. As with so many other UN issues,
7. As to the possibility that the HRC, with support from the US, might
play a salutary role in reporting on human rights abuses in Libya, or conceivably, Syria, this mistakes a temporary, transient interest of worried Arab States
vis-à-vis restive populations, not some newly-discovered commitment to neutral
principle.
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however, the majority of nations of the world vacillated, saying in speeches that they favored reform but, in the General
Assembly, continuing to confirm the same worst-abuser states.
Annan’s reform proposals set out new criteria for membership on a smaller Human Rights Council. Crucially, these
included mechanisms to avoid, as much as possible, bloc and
regional voting; requirements for supermajorities to gain
election so as to ensure that the world’s real democracies
would have a voice; a requirement that each member submit to substantive human rights review; and other mechanisms. Annan’s proposals may well have eventually resulted
in capture once again by the world’s abusers. He sought a
procedural means to ensure a certain substantive outcome,
after all, and a considerable number of the member states
who would have to enforce the result would inevitably seek
to undermine those means.
In the event, however, Annan could not secure backing
even for reform proposals that he at the outset had regarded
as grave compromises. Countries that had no direct interest in supporting the worst human rights abusers lined up
in the General Assembly, as ever, behind them to torpedo
Annan’s already watered-down proposals. The United States,
at Bolton’s direction, had pressed for even tougher reforms,
but those of course went nowhere. Bolton’s legion critics
blamed him for torpedoing Annan’s plan, but then blaming
Bolton was the convenient default position on which all UN
parties could always agree.
Annan, seeing defeat, then backed off to a new, even
weaker compromise position—one that formally abolished
the Human Rights Commission and replaced it with today’s
Human Rights Council. The new plan allowed him to salvage
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some claim of success. The price of his saving face, however,
was giving up virtually any significant procedural or substantive change that might have made a difference to the performance of the HRC going forward. The human rights NGOs
offered a disgraceful policy performance of support for the
farcical “compromise” that demonstrated mostly their preference for procedural “internationalism” for its own sake over
the substance of human rights; the incident at least had the
virtue of clarifying Human Rights Watch’s otherwise opaque
ideology of the relative priority of internationalism and the
substance of rights. The United States, at Bolton’s insistence,
held out for Annan’s original position, and when that failed,
the United States announced that it would not put itself
forward for membership on the new HRC. This was widely
denounced as a combination of US whining and bullying—
once again, another version of the insistence that even on
issues of symbolic participation and fundamental human
rights values, the United States must always engage and has
only to gain and nothing to lose thereby. This was, and is,
specious nonsense.
The results today are every bit as dismal as Bolton predicted, indeed worse. The HRC is again dominated and led
by the abusers. Indeed, their dominance never for a moment
stopped. It has issued more reports on Israel in a three-year
period than on all other 191 member states combined. It has
headed off criticism of Sudan over Darfur and over a long list
of other gravely serious human rights situations. Its general
strategy has been to shift away from attention to individual
countries—excepting, of course, Israel—in favor of pursuing thematic issues of human rights and UN values: development, health, the environment as abstract matters of human
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rights, for example. These issues members can discuss in the
abstract without implicating particular states.
The HRC’s motley majority of authoritarians, abusers,
unfree states, and autocrats would not even consider issues
of the abuses relevant to its own members while nonetheless
finding time for the member from Sri Lanka to issue a call for
the United Kingdom to hold a referendum on the apparently
burning issue of its undemocratic monarchy. Within just a few
months of the new HRC’s beginning its work, even the New
York Times editorial board concluded with some vehemence
that the new body had proven to be worse than no change
at all. The New York Times editorial view notwithstanding,
the HRC is the body to which the Obama administration
meekly petitioned, and obtained membership for the United
States. It is a move that has been widely applauded by those
for whom engagement is its own virtue and its own reward.
The US ambassador to the Human Rights Council seems to
spend her days defending the council and the houses of playing cards that the US spends its time building there: look,
we got a sentence not wholly hostile out of x country, and
country y agreed to water down the latest anti-Israel screed
by an adjective or two, and so on.8 A statement mildly in
favor of gay rights excites Ambassador Eileen Donahoe, less
for its content than for her ability to point at it and say, “The
Human Rights Council is not all bad!”9 Well, all in all, it is.
8. Eileen Donahoe, “Fighting the Good Fight,” New York Times,
International Herald Tribune, September 13, 2010, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/14/opinion/14iht-eddonahoe.html.
9. US Department of State, Briefing on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender (LGBT) Resolution at UN Human Rights Council, June 17, 2011,
available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/rm/2011/166470.htm.
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The fundamental issue is, and should be, why is the United
States even there? and the answer is, it should not be.
Historian of the human rights movement Samuel Moyn—
no conservative, certainly—suggests that the Obama administration’s approach to human rights is to emphasize that all
countries are sinners, and what separates us in such venues as
the Human Rights Council is a matter of degree, not kind.10
This is right, but an approach to human rights that emphasizes that the United States’ human rights failings, or, for
that matter, Sweden’s or Costa Rica’s, are not really all that
different from those of Syria, Iran, North Korea, and above
all China, is not one that takes seriously the idea that countries have to face strong bilateral pressure to change. It is
mostly about confessing US sins, in any case, in a misguided
and, as ever, doomed-to-failure bid to ingratiate the United
States into world opinion by abasing itself. The rest of the
world takes signals from this—and they have little to do
with human rights and a lot to do with whether the United
States intends to play its rough-and-ready role as provider of
basic public goods. This is one of the many problems with
embracing a view that violation of human rights is a matter
of weak sinners, all; the message taken by much of the world
is weakness, and not just about human rights.
It is right that the United States state clearly its views about
its own human rights compliance; it has done a bad thing for
the cause of human rights for actual individuals around the
world, however, if it is unable to distinguish between degrees
and absolute kinds of violations. In any case, this kind of
10. Samuel Moyn, “Human Rights in History,” Nation, August 11, 2010,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/153993/human-rights-history.
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“weak sinner” language lasts only until the United States
decides that force might have to be used—and suddenly the
language shifts over to moral absolutes. The rest of the world
might be forgiven for thinking that the decision to use force
comes first, and the moral absolutes come afterward.
There are parts of the United Nations’ human rights
bureaucracy that are not all bad and to some extent, at least,
independent of the member states that make up the membership. Some of the human rights special rapporteurs on
particular issues do their jobs faithfully as independent and
impartial experts, as do some of the independent commissions of inquiry. It is important for Americans to understand
just how vital to various global situations these activities can
be—particularly those that deal directly with country situations, such as those in Sudan, Guatemala, Burundi and others.
The so-called “thematic” special rapporteurs, who deal not
with country-specific situations but broad topics such as education, food, adequate housing, etc., can sometimes be much
more problematic, in that they largely set their own agendas
in relation to human rights. Sometimes the person appointed
as special rapporteur is troubling; unsurprisingly, these have
mostly to do with Israel. Princeton professor Richard Falk,
for example, a special rapporteur on Israel-Palestine, was
appointed despite having publicly expressed questions as to
whether the Bush administration might have known about
the 2001 attacks ahead of time; more recently he sent around
on the Web a cartoon easily seen as anti-Semitic.11
11. The US government called for Falk’s removal. See United States
Mission to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in
Geneva, “U.S. Urges UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Condemn
Falk’s ‘Hateful Speech,’” July 8, 2011, available at http://geneva.usmission
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The leading controversy over rapporteurs and their missions and reports has concerned South African jurist Richard
Goldstone’s report on the Gaza war. From the original
one-sided nature of the council’s mandate to Goldstone’s
methods for gathering facts and witnesses, the report could
scarcely be said to constitute an objective or factually accurate document or to provide adequate legal grounds for its
conclusions asserting Israeli war crimes. This did not stop
the NGO advocates from whipping up a diverse coalition of
HRC member states to ensure that this deeply flawed report
was duly reported out, however. Remarkably, Goldstone has
seemingly repudiated important parts of his own report;
unremarkably, that has had little impact on the use of the
report itself.
In some cases, it makes sense for the United States to
cooperate—to an extent—with a UN human rights rapporteur. The Obama administration, for example, ought to
provide the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial execution with a robust defense of the legality of the US program
of targeted killing in the war on terror, rather than simply
stonewalling; starting with the observation it has already
made, however, that though the US government will defend
its policies, the requests of the special rapporteur exceed its
mandate. The United States should make equally clear, however, that it concedes no legal consequences for it or its government officials irrespective of a rapporteur report and that
the rapporteur’s views of international law merit any special
deference. In other cases, such as the UN special rapporteur
.gov/2011/07/08/u-s-urges-un-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-to
-condemn-falk’s-“hateful-speech”.
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on human rights and counterterrorism, the special rapporteur received considerable cooperation from the State
Department but, as the US government noted, had obviously
begun from a legal conclusion quite at odds with either the
Bush administration’s (or the Obama administration’s) view.
The special rapporteur started from the view that there was
an irreducible human rights obligation to try or release all
detainees—an absolutist position that, however popular with
advocacy groups, has no grounding in law as understood by
the United States. There is no point in dealing with rapporteurs or processes that are stacked in advance.
There is no good reason why the United States needs to be
on the Human Rights Council in order to support the limited
amount of good work done by a small number of expert functionaries who function within the United Nations’ human
rights agencies.12 The harm vastly outweighs the benefits. The
United States’ ability to create or curtail policy, as a single
member in a sea of bloc voting, is minimal. And the argument that the United States somehow “has to be” a member
of the HRC in order to engage in diplomacy, or more “effectively” engage in diplomacy around human rights issues, is
flatly untrue. The United States can always be a diplomatic
player when it wants to be, member or not. That is not a matter of membership but of what political capital it is willing
to expend. Does anyone think that the United States cannot
throw its political weight around if it really wants to do so or
raise costs to countries for doing things at the United Nations
12. This discussion glosses over the technical details of differences between
the Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and various other agencies of the UN not needed for this discussion.
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if it really wants to? The problem is, rather, that the United
States does not want to expend the political capital in the
real world in order to affect what goes on in the hothouse of
the United Nations. And what the United States cannot take
back, once having joined, is the legitimacy that its presence
conveys.
This legitimation will not trouble the liberal internationalist idealist eager to see the United States subsume its
sovereignty to the sovereign equality of states and subordinate its democracy to global institutions and law. Such a person will discern a humble America, not a weak one—and a
deservedly humbled America, at that. Nor will it trouble the
New Liberal Realists, who will see an America that does not
stand on symbols and ceremony about human rights moralism in order to show that America knows its newly humble
place in the world. This New Liberal Realist America does
not worry overmuch about the internal quality of regimes
when they are newly wealthy and powerful and when America
owes them trillions. The New Liberal Realists get directly to
the realist nub of the matter: of course one talks with one’s
enemies, without messing with pretexts and preconditions,
because they are the only ones truly worth talking to. It is
a badge of honor, in the realist calculation—an indication
of political heroism and courage, not pusillanimity—for the
Obama administration not to hide behind pretexts of human
rights, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and general wickedness as reasons not to engage.
There are profound downsides to this realist policy, however, whether undertaken at the United Nations or in bilateral
relations. One is that, as has been increasingly observed, despots have taken the measure of the American administration
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and do not fear it. Apparently, they do not understand the
difference between a humble and a weak America. They see
the American eagerness to always engage, not as a sign of
American self-confidence, but as exploitable weakness and
as a signal of American desire to withdraw via multilateralism. A second is that, in the necessarily complicated dance
between the United States and repressive regimes and their
restive populations, the policy of always engage favors the
regime. Whatever the precise and appropriate message to
a justly rebellious populace such as that in Iran, systematic
engagement with the regime disfavors the popular resistance
with whom America’s values and interests finally lie. Has
the United States learned this lesson today in dealing with
Syria’s Assad and his restive population, who at this writing
are being slaughtered by Syrian forces? The Obama administration, to its credit, has stepped away from Assad—better
late than never—and American diplomats in that country
have bravely continued to travel to the besieged towns. It is
too early to know what will come of this; or whether this
represents a late-term lesson that always engage with despots
is a bad heuristic.
The language of human rights will not go away at the
United Nations; the rhetoric of the categorical imperative is
too enticing to leave behind. But it will be rivaled over time,
perhaps, by new languages of values and by the revival of
old ones, perhaps in the categorical language of rights and
perhaps not. These alternatives include a resurrection of the
ideals of world peace and, particularly, nuclear disarmament.
They include climate change and economic development and
the proclaimed justice of transfer payments from the rich
world to the poor world. The striking feature of these new

Disengage and Obstruct

247

languages of values, however, is that they seriously curtail
any need to point at any country or regime in particular as
being bad or evil or wicked (excepting, of course, the United
States and Israel). A move toward such nonaccusatory language was precisely what President Obama announced in his
UN appearances in September 2009; the new forms of values
espoused by the United States at the United Nations would
focus on shared concerns and not matters that might require
serious judgment of good and evil. Moral judgment was so
neoconservative and Bush administration. The United States
could not hope to judge until some day it got its own house
in order.
The wave of the future appears to be a deemphasizing
of pressure by the United States and any other great power
for human rights compliance. Europe consists less and less
of great powers, or even powers. It is even more turned in
upon itself and its aging population than, so far, the United
States even proposes to be; even as it talks gamely of global
constitutionalism and governance through multilateral institutions, its attention is upon itself, consuming itself and its
social capital and its seed corn. The rising powers—China,
India, Brazil, and so on—are more keen on appropriating
the language of human rights for the legitimacy of their policies of economic growth and poverty reduction internally
and less keen on using national power as a source of pressure
against other states to honor them. The old system established certain partly universal, partly international mechanisms for determining who should be called out for human
rights violations—and then to a very large degree depended
upon the willingness of powerful states to make things happen. It has broken down in all sorts of ways, starting with the
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lessened willingness of great powers to engage in that kind
of pressure and the suggestion that bodies like international
tribunals can do the job instead—a proposition remarkably
sanguine at best.
Moreover, the new values ascendant at the United Nations
feed into mechanisms of engagement and multilateralism that
conspicuously require little actual commitment apart from
the long-shot possibility of massive payoffs to the developing
world. The new multilateralism rests remarkably lightly on
sovereign shoulders, including above all—it cannot enough
be said—the United States. The Obama administration does
not seem unhappy with this, far from it; sovereign “ownership” of obligations to press for human rights for others in
the world is all burden and no benefit, it seems. But the new
multilateralism also rests remarkably lightly upon the shoulders of the United Nations, which is to say that if and when a
true humanitarian or human rights crisis happens—genocide
redux—all of it is likely to turn out to have been kabuki. No
one will step up, no one will bear responsibility; the hegemon has retired, and the point of intersection between UN
collective security and UN values—responsibility at least to
prevent genocide—nonexistent.
Shall we raise Libya as a counterexample? Apart from
being too soon prudently to draw conclusions, the most obvious answer is that Britain and France could barely raise the
air power necessary to the job, even with massive behind-thescenes support plus drones from the United States, to avoid a
stalemate and finally bring down Gaddafi; it is far from clear
that they will ever dare try such a thing again, for fear of
outright losing. It will not be long before the capacity to do
so might be lost in large swaths of the world. This is presum-
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ably why Western humanitarian interventionists are offering
strange new respect to the humanitarian virtues of drones. It
will be drones, and not much else, that in the future might be
the only developed-world armed forces available for undertaking responsibility to protect. It is better to have robots of war
than nothing at all. In any case, in a world that is simultaneously more multilateral and multipolar, with more competitive and jostling great powers for whom the United Nations is
a place for negotiation, humanitarian intervention is going to
face many more hurdles there, in the Security Council, than
in the easy days of the 1999 Kosovo war.
Needless to say, this multilateralist power vacuum is not
a good thing for the cause of human rights, but neither is
it good for the United States. It favors neither its values—
obviously—but it also undermines its hard realist interests
because of the profound signal to the world that the hegemon
is no more. Hegemony is never just about power; it is about
power that carries a certain legitimacy about certain baseline
values and that carries enough others in its train because they
trust the combination of its values and its power. To give
up that legitimacy—which owes exactly zero to the United
Nations—is to give up a vast amount of residual power. It is
not the silliness of “smart power” as imagined by the Obama
administration early-term theorists—imagining a world of
power through multilateral institutions—but instead the
residual power of legitimacy that arises when other countries
as a matter of sufficiently shared internal values acquiesce and
do not actively oppose the hegemon and even provide support both moral and material.
Meanwhile, the “hard” values and mechanisms of human
rights are sliding away in favor of soft-focus values that put
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far fewer demands on anyone whose compliance with them
would actually matter. As in the global security field, multilateral engagement over the hardness of human rights is actually mostly cover for American disengagement.
In short, the language of rights is not going away, but
rights are being redefined at the United Nations in ways that
recast certain fundamental ideals of the United Nations and
pose fundamental issues for the United States. The evidence
of fundamental change in the nature of values and rights at
the United Nations, still tentative, is gradually accumulating.
It has reached the point at which one can speculate about
the gradual transformation of the values and human rights
language of the United Nations from a vehicle mostly for
international progressive politics into a vehicle—and this
is a remarkable transformation, seen over the entire postwar period—for the binding expression of global religious
communalism.
Free expression is the liberal canary in the UN mineshaft. The indications are not auspicious, and the Islamic
conference—a bloc of Muslim states at the United
Nations—and its allies have for several years been agitating
at the Human Rights Council, at the two Durban conferences, and in other venues for language to protect religion
from insult or offensive expression. The rhetoric for expressing these deeply illiberal sentiments is, however incongruously, impeccably the language of human rights. And the
model for these provisions is likewise drawn impeccably from
other measures sponsored by and endorsed by liberal and
progressive human rights organizations—measures against
hate speech; against incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious
hatred; and other such carve-outs from the guarantees of
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free expression. These efforts recapitulate similar efforts at
the national level. European and Asian countries often have
sweeping laws against hate speech and incitement to ethnic or
religious hatred that in practice often amount to laws against
blasphemy. For its part, international human rights law does
contain various exceptions to full expression, on incitement
grounds—though these were traditionally interpreted narrowly and not as, in effect, an invitation to blasphemy laws.
At the United Nations, the Islamic bloc has pursued these
agendas with much greater effect today than in earlier years.
Most striking in this long-running campaign, however, has
been the general paucity of response from the human rights
community. Again, the marriage of politically progressive views on free expression and those of illiberal religionists is not a new phenomenon within national politics, but
it is nonetheless striking and deeply disheartening to see
the tepid (at best) support given by the leading human
rights organizations to the defense of free expression. It is
as though they feel, when pressed, that they must say something—but they have no deep commitment to it other than
as a strategic political obligation. The days of these organizations’ serving as robust defenders of free expression are long
gone—and, as they pander to the new demographics, never
to return. Sadly, funding in Saudi Arabia will also have that
effect, of course.
This leaves, of course, America—ironically, the most religious of the large Western democracies—alone as the last bulwark of the rights of a pure secular liberalism that is ironically
not really its own and defender of the free-expression rights of
heretics, apostates, and blasphemers. The United States does
the job that human rights organizations and all the machinery
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of human rights protection will not bestir themselves to do,
partly for fear of giving offense to the increasingly aggressive global Muslim community and partly simply because the
human rights community’s heart is no longer in it.
What the struggle over free expression signifies is that
human rights is no longer even a language that is unequivocally, in its substance, the language of freedom and liberty.
It signifies that the self-appointed human rights community
has only a nostalgic, historical, and contingent connection to
rights in a secular liberal sense. This community retains that
connection only when using rights as a progressive stick by
which to attack democratic politics. The language and apparatus of liberal internationalism is gradually shifting at the
United Nations—and, in this rare case, the United Nations
is the epicenter of this change—toward something that we
might call multicultural internationalism. And this multicultural internationalism is another name for global religious
communalism. Human rights is no longer about individual
human rights. Human rights are transformed into a global
management tool by which various global elites seek to manage group relations, particularly among religious communities; global human rights organizations are this evolving
universalism’s service providers.
There is a model for this new order, but it is not the
European Enlightenment. It is the world of the Ottoman
Empire. It was a relatively humane social and political order,
in its way, a governance order of clear communal religious
relations. And this sort of religious communalism as a global
order is a worldview very congenial to many of the world’s
elites, particularly Muslim states at the United Nations. They
do not see it as a step backwards but forwards, a relatively just
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and humane way of organizing global governance. There is
no particular reason, after all, why global governance has
to be organized according to liberal internationalism. And
they have found, with considerable endorsement from the
human rights community, ways to frame the call for global
religious communalism as a matter of human rights. This
might well be the tendency of the United Nations and its
values on into the future. But three things it is not: secular,
free, and liberal.
So the conclusions across these highly disparate topics—
loosely related by a notion of “values” at the United Nations,
but not much else—are these. First, the fundamental stance
in dealing with the General Assembly should be containment
of its material and spiritual resources—and open opposition
and criticism on matters considered of importance. In that
process, it is important at every turn to stress what the UN
Charter says of the General Assembly—this being one of the
key innovations of the United Nations over the League of
Nations—that resolutions of the General Assembly are nonbinding. They are not “international law”; they have no status as anything other than a recommendation of the motley
run of nations that have nothing to lose in letting the craziest
parties run the forum.
Second, it is a very bad idea to indulge strategic ambiguity
as a way of thinking the circle has been squared. The tendency to this in the Obama administration is strong, if only
because its ideological apparatus is seemingly divided between
the largely irreconcilable strands of liberal internationalist
idealism and the New Liberal Realism. It therefore thinks
it can trade off these symbolic issues against other issues,
harder issues of hard realism and interest. It cannot. Strategic
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ambiguity merely signals weakness on these and much else
and not merely to those who follow the strong horse but also
to those who depend upon the legitimacy of hegemon, but
only if it is around for the long run. They flee. They seek
other arrangements, and why not?
The United States cannot win fights in these “values”
forums—whether the HRC or the whole circus of international conferences or similar venues. This is in part because it
cannot win in negotiation settings devoted to “consensus”
and in part because, at the end of the day, not even the Obama
administration can negotiate fundamental American values
that run counter to its internal constitutional gift, its institutional and popular settlement. The United States is a democratic sovereign, committed to popular self-government, a
“political community, without a political superior.” There
the matter rests. There is nothing to negotiate as to American
fundamentals, and to enter such forums is to leave in humiliation, after having granted legitimacy where one should
not. Third, the very notion of human rights is evolving in
these multilateral forums at the United Nations and among
the international NGOs, and the only long-term result of the
United States following in train will be to deprive a language
of historical and moral force of any deep, and thereby necessarily limited, meaning.
The much harder task is proactive delegitimation of processes and forums that, over time, propose to deprive the
terms of human rights of meanings that have been built up
with difficulty over long periods. The United States should
not be looking to “engage” with these processes—on the
contrary, it should reject, obstruct, object, disengage, and
make engagement more costly for others. The virtue of this
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policy will only become clearer as the content of universal
values at the United Nations comes ever more closely to
be that of global religious communalism. Leave cheerleading for the conversion of human rights into a language of a
revived Ottoman Empire to the human rights organizations,
as they scurry to seek their self-aggrandizing yet unrequited
places in this new communalist multilateralism of values.
Perhaps they—and the states that go along with the new
global communalism in place of liberal democratic values—
can yet get themselves declared “defenders of the faith.”
The United States, for its part, has a more universal order of
values—ironically, both more universal and yet an order
of its own—which it is obliged to preserve, protect, and
defend.

